#Gate广场四月发帖挑战

On March 31, 2026, Weixin Jinke released its full-year financial report for 2025, marking a dramatic turnaround in performance. In the first half of the year, the company achieved a net profit of 216 million yuan; however, by the end of the year, it recorded a net loss of 560 million yuan.

This was the most challenging year in the company's recent history. Due to the performance loss, the board of directors does not recommend paying any interim dividends for this year.

Bad debt ratio nearly doubled; monthly loan disbursements fell below 1 billion

In the first half of 2025, Weixin Jinke achieved total revenue of 2.5 billion yuan, a 43.8% increase year-over-year; net profit was 216 million yuan, a significant 79.5% increase, demonstrating strong profitability resilience.

However, in the second half, industry conditions and operational circumstances sharply deteriorated. Ultimately, Weixin Jinke recorded a full-year net loss of 560 million yuan in 2025, meaning that the quarterly loss in the second half reached 776 million yuan, 1.6 times the company's total net profit of 478 million yuan in 2024, completely erasing the profit.

In terms of scale, in 2025, Weixin Jinke's total loan facilitation volume reached 58.45 billion yuan, a 4.8% increase year-over-year. But due to the implementation of new assisted loan regulations and the overall rise in market credit risk, the company's loan disbursements in the second half declined significantly, with the ending loan balance dropping to 21.78 billion yuan, a 35.1% decrease from the end of the first half of 2025.

Entering 2026, Weixin Jinke's loan scale continued to shrink. Bo Ge, in "Balance Falls Below 20 Billion, New Customer Loans in February Only 20 Million, Mid-tier Assisted Loans Struggling to Survive," mentioned that in January and February, the company's loan volumes were approximately 1.2 billion yuan and just over 1 billion yuan, respectively. By March, the disbursement scale further declined to 900 million yuan, falling below the 1 billion yuan mark.

Based on this, it is estimated that the company's first-quarter loan volume was over 15.73B yuan, which is less than the monthly loan volume of comparable companies.

Behind the shrinking scale is enormous pressure on asset quality. Weixin Jinke's various overdue data surged to recent highs. Among them, the first overdue rate increased to 1.01%, up 43 basis points from 0.58% a year earlier; the overdue rate for over three months rose to 5.99%, nearly doubling from 3.02% last year.

Additionally, according to multiple industry insiders, the company has recently partnered with several capital providers to launch "extension" businesses to delay the exposure of asset risks.

High growth in intermediary business; entering Indonesia and facing penalties

Despite the overall performance pressure in 2025, Weixin Jinke's business also has some bright spots, particularly in intermediary revenue and overseas expansion.

The financial report shows that "other income" under the "technology and platform service fees" (originally listed as membership fees, referral fees, and other service fees) saw significant growth, reaching 577 million yuan for the year, a 155% increase year-over-year, serving as an important support for the company's performance.

In terms of overseas business, Weixin Jinke made progress in 2025. Currently, the company's overseas layout is divided into three parts: first, in 2023, it successfully obtained a private lending license in Hong Kong and launched online consumer finance business through "CreFIT Weixin," but the company has not yet disclosed operational data for this business; second, in 2023, it initiated the acquisition of Portuguese bank BPG, which has not yet completed the transaction as of April 2026; third, in 2025, it officially entered the Indonesian market, becoming a new focus of the company's overseas expansion.

Specifically, in 2025, Weixin Jinke acquired an 85% stake in Indonesian P2P company PT Doeku Peduli Indonesia for 300M Indonesian rupiah (about 6.5 million yuan), successfully gaining entry into the Indonesian market.

According to Bo Ge, in the second half of 2025, Weixin Jinke achieved scaled loan operations locally in Indonesia, with some success in overseas expansion.

However, recent tightening regulations in Indonesia cast a shadow over Weixin Jinke's overseas plans. The Indonesian Competition Commission (KPPU) recently fined 97 P2P companies a total of over 300 million yuan (about 41.65 million USD for Weixin, and 19.99 million USD for YangQianGuan), and PT Doeku Peduli Indonesia, recently acquired by Weixin Jinke, was also among the fined entities.

Getting fined right after entering the Indonesian market raises questions about Weixin Jinke's timing.

Heavy investment in virtual asset platforms

Beyond traditional consumer finance and overseas expansion, Weixin Jinke has continued to increase its focus on the crypto and Web3.0 sectors in recent years, strategically investing in virtual asset ecosystems as a key part of its business transformation.

In 2024, the company invested approximately HKD 16 million to indirectly acquire a 15% stake in Thousand Whales Technology (BVI) Limited, a virtual asset trading platform, marking an early-stage layout.

In 2025, Weixin Jinke further increased its investment, spending HKD 2.4B to invest in EXIO Group Limited (EX top IO blue), which is licensed by the Hong Kong Securities and Futures Commission as one of the first licensed Virtual Asset Trading Platforms (VATP). The platform focuses on small loans and stablecoins, positioning itself as a fusion of traditional finance and Web3.0 ecosystems.

In terms of strategic approach, Weixin Jinke has not acquired full ownership of crypto-related assets but has instead taken strategic stakes, leveraging licensed platforms to explore compliant virtual asset financial services, creating synergies with its core consumer finance business.

More domestic lending companies are increasingly venturing into crypto assets and overseas markets, such as Yirendai mentioned earlier. This trend is also accompanied by more domestic assisted loan bosses relocating abroad, some never returning. Bo Ge previously analyzed that part of this is due to the domestic internet credit market reaching a peak, while another part is a channel for capital to go overseas.