Guotai Haitong: Perdagangan "stagnasi-inflasi" jangka pendek mungkin akan terus berlanjut, perhatikan titik balik "tiga pilar"

7 April, Cathay Pacific Huitong released a macro research report stating that there are many conflicts in the negotiation conditions currently proposed by both the US and Iran, and that even reaching an agreement still faces enormous uncertainty. Through the “tiered clearance” of the Strait of Hormuz, there are initial signs of relaxation. However, even if geopolitical tensions are significantly eased afterwards, oil prices are still unlikely to return to their pre-conflict levels, with the central point possibly or clearly rising. In the short term, monitor Trump’s “war supplemental budget”, the status of the Strait of Mandeb, and the status of Hark Island; if the conflict escalates, oil prices still have room to surge. Focus on the inflection point where the market shifts from “stagflation trade” to “recovery trade”; a “three-in-one” of the geopolitical situation inflection point, the inflection point in expectations for Fed rate cuts, and the inflection point in asset prices.

The Iran-US negotiations still face a high degree of uncertainty. Previously, the US proposed 15 ceasefire conditions: the core demands from the US side include Iran’s complete abandonment of nuclear capabilities, limiting missiles, stopping support for regional armed groups, permanently opening the Strait of Hormuz, etc., in exchange for the lifting of sanctions. Iran proposed 5 ceasefire conditions: completely stopping aggression, a security guarantee mechanism, full war reparations, ceasefire across all fronts, and recognizing sovereignty over the strait. However, there are many conflicts between the ceasefire conditions of both sides, leading to slow progress. In the short term, the possibility of reaching an agreement faces extremely high uncertainty.

Initial signs of relaxation in the Strait of Hormuz. On March 30, Iran’s parliamentary National Security Commission officially approved the “Strait of Hormuz Transit Fee Bill,” making it a national law. But actual fee collection has not yet been fully implemented; at present, it is in a state of “strict control, low fees, tiered clearance.” Recently, Iran has shifted from “comprehensive blockade” to “tiered approval and release,” showing initial signs of relaxation.

But we believe that even if geopolitical tensions are significantly eased, oil prices are still unlikely to return to their position before the conflict, and the central point of oil prices may be significantly lifted. First, even if the physical blockade of the Strait of Hormuz is lifted, the psychological blockade remains, making it difficult to return to the pre-conflict level of about 120–140 vessels per day passing through; second, supply chains and facilities have been damaged, and repairs are extremely slow—oil fields may take about 2–6 months, and pipelines about 3–12 months; third, the global inventory is at a low level and the replenishment demand— the United States, the European Union, Japan, and India urgently release oil reserves to cushion oil prices. The IEA government strategic reserves are about 1.2 billion barrels; currently, the plan is to release about 400 million barrels, to be deployed over 120 days (mid-March to July). It is expected that continuous additional demand will arise in the next 1–2 years; fourth, OPEC+ proactively reduces production to lock in high oil prices. Taken together, we expect that after the conflict, in the short term, the new price central point will be 85–95 dollars per barrel, making it difficult to return to the pre-war level of 50–60 dollars.

If there is an escalation of the conflict in the short term, oil prices may continue to surge in the short term. Indicators to observe whether the conflict will escalate afterwards: first, whether the US’s 200 billion dollars “war supplemental budget” for Iran can be passed. Second, the status of the Strait of Mandeb. Third, whether the US military will land on Hark Island. If any of the above events occur, or if it means that the conflict will further escalate, oil prices may face a significant surge risk.

Focus on the inflection point where the market shifts from “stagflation trade” to “recovery trade” afterwards; the inflection point in the geopolitical situation, the inflection point in expectations for the Fed’s rate cuts, and the inflection point in asset prices are “three-in-one.” In the short term, the “stagflation trade” is still continuing to ferment. US stocks and US Treasuries have been hit significantly; if geopolitics is later eased, oil prices will basically stabilize, and expectations for Fed rate cuts may reverse—moving from the current stance of no rate cuts, or even rate hikes, to new expectations for rate cuts—then US stocks and US Treasuries may see an inflection point. Under the current dominance of geopolitical conditions, the inflection point in the geopolitical situation, the inflection point in expectations for Fed rate cuts, and the inflection point in asset prices are “three-in-one.” If extreme events occur, such as the conflict continuing to escalate for a much longer time than expected, it may drag the economy and the market into a prolonged “recession trade.” Under the baseline expectation, in the next 1–2 months, there may be an inflection point from the “stagflation trade” to the “recovery trade.”

Performance of global major asset classes. Last week (2026.3.27-2026.4.3), crude oil fell, gold rose, global stock markets diverged; Europe and the US overall rose, while Asia-Pacific overall fell.

Economy: The US economy still shows resilience, and inflation expectations are rising, suppressing expectations for Fed rate cuts; affected by geopolitical conditions, oil prices, etc., the recovery momentum in the Eurozone has slowed.