From "Hamburger Hill" to the Landing on Halki Island: Strategic Suicide by Different Paths

Ask AI · What is the full background and story behind the Halqé Island incident?

【Key Takeaways】

1. Whether it’s “Hamburger Heights” or Halqé Island, the U.S. military was wrong in where it started, wrong in its direction, and therefore found itself trapped in the predicament of “the harder you try in the wrong direction, the more you fail.”

2. In the “Battle of Hamburger Heights,” the U.S. military still had a complete “tactical victory,” but on Halqé Island, the U.S. military’s strategic mistakes will quickly spill over into the tactical level.

3. Back then, the United States could endure the reality of the catastrophic defeat in the “Battle of Hamburger Heights” and the trauma of the Vietnam War, but today’s United States cannot afford the failure of the “Battle of Halqé Island” nor the disintegration of Middle East hegemony.

By | Gao Shu

In America’s “Vietnam War trauma,” the “Battle of Hamburger Heights” is one of the most representative “scars.”

From February 28, when the U.S.-Israel-Iran conflict broke out, until now, Iran’s “oil throat,” Halqé Island, has remained the focus of the U.S. military. As of the time of writing, the U.S. military has already begun airstrikes on Halqé Island, but airborne operations or amphibious landings have not yet been launched. Against this backdrop, has anyone considered the question: does the U.S. taking Halqé Island automatically mean victory? To sort this out, you can refer to the U.S. military’s brutal “Hamburger Heights” battle from 57 years ago.

Tactical Victory = Strategic Quagmire

1. A Shared Deadly Weakness in the Wrong Location

Back then, in Vietnam, what U.S. troops feared most was the night and the “talking trees.” Now, similar difficulties may well be repeating themselves.

The fatal commonality between the “Battle of Hamburger Heights” and the “Battle of Halqé Island” starts with a fundamental error in choosing the site. Both are “dead zones” with no strategic depth and that are difficult to hold—forming a vicious cycle of “the more securely you take them, the higher the cost.” The 937 Hill in 1969 (“Hamburger Heights”) is at 937 meters above sea level and far from the “Ho Chi Minh Trail.” The terrain is steep and supplies are hard to secure. Even if the U.S. military captured it, it could not form strategic deterrence; instead, due to long-term garrisoning, it exposed the position to North Vietnamese night raids and harassment. Today, Halqé Island covers only 20 square kilometers and is just 25 kilometers from Iran proper—fully within the saturation strike range of shore-based missiles and drone formations. Once forces land on the island, they fall into a “missile funnel.” The shared deadliest weakness of both battlefields lies here: the more successful the tactical occupation is and the longer troops remain exposed, casualties rise exponentially with the length of time spent garrisoning—eventually turning tactical victory into a catalyst for strategic passivity.

For the U.S. military, Halqé Island is not “something it cannot fight.” The real question is whether taking Halqé Island is truly a “means” or a “goal.”

From basic military common sense, strategic strongpoints must have core value: controlling transportation, projecting threat, and enabling long-term garrisoning. Neither “Hamburger Heights” nor Halqé Island meets these conditions. “Hamburger Heights” neither holds key routes nor affects North Vietnam’s core supply; it becomes an attack target only because “the enemy is here.” By contrast, although Halqé Island is a hub for Iran’s oil exports, after the occupation it cannot completely cut off Iran’s energy output channels. Instead, it will lead to a war of attrition due to prolonged garrisoning. This kind of site selection—“no strategic value, yet forced to attack”—is bound to make tactical victory the beginning of a strategic quagmire: the more you fight, the deeper you get stuck; the more you win, the more passive you become.

2. “Fighting Just to Fight” Under Political Captivity

Among the many mistaken decision-making processes of the U.S. military in the Vietnam War, the harm caused by “kill rates” is the greatest; to a certain extent, it directly contributed to America’s defeat in Vietnam.

The outbreak of both campaigns was not based on clear strategic objectives, but was instead captured by political and face-saving needs, turning into a political performance of “fighting just to fight.” In the “Battle of Hamburger Heights,” the U.S. military initiated the “Apache Snow” operation, intended to clear North Vietnamese forces in the A Sầu River Valley. But due to early offensives that led to stalemate on 937 Hill, casualties kept climbing. To avoid having the sacrifices from the early stage be wasted, U.S. leadership ordered continued attacks anyway, distorting tactical advancement into a political task. At this point, the fighting had already departed from military logic and became a tool for maintaining authority within the command structure.

If the U.S. has penetrated Iran so thoroughly, it should understand that the main force behind Iran’s oil exports is no longer dependent on this kind of “official channel” via Halqé Island.

The potential conflict in the “Battle of Halqé Island” is also dominated by political factors. If the United States were to launch a landing operation, it would essentially be to fulfill commitments to allies and to suppress Iran’s nuclear program, rather than being driven by real military needs. Military experts have long pointed out that crippling Iran’s oil export does not require a landing to seize the island; it can be achieved through air and sea strikes alone. A landing operation to seize the island is entirely redundant—nothing more than a needless political gamble. This decision logic—“politics comes first, the military follows”—caused both campaigns to lose the essence of military action, turning them into tools serving domestic political and diplomatic bargaining.

From the Vietnam War to the U.S.-Israel-Iran conflict, once any side gets trapped on the battlefield by “sunk costs,” it has already lost.

The shared tragedy of both campaigns is that tactical victory is treated directly as the strategic objective, trapping the effort in a deadly snare of “sunk costs.” In the “Battle of Hamburger Heights,” every time U.S. forces captured positions and killed enemy troops, it became the justification to keep pressing forward. Soldiers’ casualties were repeatedly forced into the role of “the cost that must be paid to advance,” ultimately turning the fight from a clearing operation into an endless mountain-terrain slaughter. In the “Battle of Halqé Island,” if war breaks out and the U.S. achieves initial landings, domestic public opinion and political circles will interpret tactical success as “victory is in sight,” compelling the military to keep adding troops and expanding the operation—so that the U.S. will go farther and farther down the wrong path, unable to withdraw safely with its whole force intact.

3. Win the Battle, Lose the Whole Picture

In the “Battle of Hamburger Heights,” what truly broke the U.S. military’s will to resist was not sacrifice itself, but sacrifice without meaning—this is also a microcosm of the entire Vietnam War for the U.S. military.

The final outcomes of the “Battle of Hamburger Heights” and the “Battle of Halqé Island” will both point to the absurdity of “winning the battle and losing the whole picture.” Tactical victory has no real value; instead, it becomes a catalyst that accelerates strategic collapse. In the “Battle of Hamburger Heights,” after paying the price of 72 killed and 40 wounded, U.S. forces only held out for 10 days before withdrawing voluntarily. North Vietnamese forces then retook the positions, and all casualties and sacrifices were effectively erased to zero. This tactical victory produced no substantive impact on the overall course of the Vietnam War.

In the “Battle of Halqé Island,” “strike fast and withdraw fast” would already be the best possible tactical end state for the U.S. military—but after that, the U.S. cannot afford the strategic disaster it brings.

The potential fate of the “Battle of Halqé Island” is also hard to escape the destiny of “occupy then abandon.” Even if the U.S. manages to quickly seize the island using sea and air advantages, it cannot garrison it for long—the continued saturation strikes by Iran will push the troops stationed on the island into an impossible situation. They would either be forced to withdraw or be trapped in infinite consumption. No matter which path is chosen, early tactical victory will completely lose its meaning; instead, it will become a sign that America’s strategic credibility has gone bankrupt, causing allies to question the U.S. military’s capabilities and further shake the foundation of its Middle East hegemony.

The current fragmentation and confrontation within the United States are more severe and more complicated than during the Vietnam War era.

More importantly, tactical victories in both campaigns will magnify domestic anti-war sentiment and accelerate the process of strategic collapse. After the casualties from the “Battle of Hamburger Heights” were exposed by the media, anti-war fervor in the U.S. quickly escalated, becoming an important trigger for strategic contraction in the Vietnam War. If the “Battle of Halqé Island” were to begin, U.S. casualties would spread rapidly through modern media, sparking strong opposition among the public; at the same time, condemnation from the international community would push the U.S. into isolation. At that point, tactical victory would not be able to salvage strategic losses; instead, it would become the final straw that crushes America’s global strategy, causing the overall situation to collapse completely.

An Even More Thorough “Strategic Suicide”

1. A World Apart in Strategic Leverage

The strategic leverage of the “Battle of Halqé Island” is worlds apart from that of the “Battle of Hamburger Heights.” The former is a global weak point—“one touch and everything moves.” The latter is only a mountain-terrain confrontation confined to a local battlefield. The strategic costs differ by a factor of one hundred. The impact of the “Battle of Hamburger Heights” is limited to the A Sầu River Valley in Vietnam and only produces a brief effect on the local battlefield situation; it does not move global political or economic patterns. Even if U.S. forces withdraw, it will not trigger a chain reaction.

At present, Middle Eastern countries are unprepared—psychologically and militarily—to get drawn into the U.S.-Israel-Iran conflict, and they also face the same question: why are they fighting in the first place?

The islands related to the “Battle of Halqé Island” are the core hub for Iran’s 90% crude oil exports. Controlling this island means choking off Iran’s energy lifeline, which will inevitably trigger Iran to blockade the Strait of Hormuz—a crucial channel accounting for 40% of the world’s oil transport. Once the Strait of Hormuz is blocked, global energy prices would surge, leading to a severe energy crisis that shocks the world’s economic system. Meanwhile, Middle Eastern countries such as Saudi Arabia and the UAE would be forced into the conflict; contradictions between the U.S. and the Islamic world would be fully inflamed, triggering comprehensive geopolitical upheaval.

The U.S. military’s tactical victory in the “Battle of Halqé Island” will very likely become the “spark” for a new round of major battles in the Middle East.

The tactical victory in the “Battle of Hamburger Heights” would only affect the Vietnam War’s local battlefield conditions, with limited impact on America’s global hegemony. By contrast, tactical success in the “Battle of Halqé Island” would directly ignite a global energy crisis and a comprehensive Middle East conflict. The U.S. would be forced to bear enormous costs for global governance, while also facing strategic checks and pressures from major powers such as Russia. This difference in strategic leverage means that the “tactical victory” of the “Battle of Halqé Island,” in essence, is a more thorough form of strategic suicide than the “Battle of Hamburger Heights,” with costs far exceeding the local losses of the Vietnam War.

2. A Dimensionality-Reduction Strike Against Modern Defensive Formations

The modern defensive system of the “Battle of Halqé Island” sharply contrasts with the traditional fortifications of the “Battle of Hamburger Heights.” If the U.S. military were to occupy the island, it would face a holding-out disaster far beyond “Hamburger Heights,” turning tactical victory into a strategic trap. In the “Battle of Hamburger Heights,” the North Vietnamese defenders relied only on traditional trenches and bunkers, and the U.S. could gradually break through through methods such as covering with aerial firepower and infantry flanking maneuvers—making the island defense pattern relatively traditional.

As U.S. forces later pull much farther away from Iran proper due to landing on Halqé Island, Iran will have the conditions to organize all kinds of drone “swarm attacks.”

And in today’s Halqé Island, Iran has built a multi-layered asymmetric defense system: drone swarms can continuously conduct reconnaissance and strike targets on the island; shore-based missile groups form saturation strike networks; fast missile boats can cut off maritime supply lines; and mines can seal the surrounding waters of the island. Even if the U.S. succeeds in landing, during the island-holding phase it would face continuous, all-weather, no-dead-angle attacks. Supply lines could be interrupted at any time; personnel casualties would be difficult to control—leading to an absolute situation of “occupation means being worn down.”

Whether in the “Battle of Hamburger Heights” or the “Battle of Halqé Island,” severe casualties will further weigh heavily on the morale of U.S. troops, and the consequences afterward are likely to be far worse than anyone imagines.

The holding-out dilemma in the “Battle of Hamburger Heights” is limited to the close-range attrition of mountain infantry. But the pressure to hold Halqé Island in the “Battle of Halqé Island” is saturation strike pressure from modern integrated air-sea-land operations. In the “Battle of Hamburger Heights,” the U.S. could still rely on firepower advantages to advance step by step; but in the “Battle of Halqé Island,” it will face “low-cost, high-efficiency” asymmetric counterattacks. Each tactical success will invite even more violent retaliatory strikes. Ultimately, the island-holding operation becomes a consumption war destined to fail—its strategic suicide nature far surpassing that of the “Battle of Hamburger Heights.”

Strategic Twins Spanning Half a Century

1. The Same Kind of Mistake at the Start

The “Battle of Hamburger Heights” and the “Battle of Halqé Island” are strategic twins across half a century. Their errors begin with the same-origin battlefield-selection problem—both initiate combat at places with no strategic value, difficult to hold long-term, and with costs that expand without limit. The 1969 “Hamburger Heights” was far from North Vietnam’s core supply lines. The terrain is harsh and offers no radiating value. The U.S. assault happened only because “the enemy is here,” completely violating the basic principle of “attacking what matters.”

After the U.S. takes Halqé Island, Iran’s earlier large stockpiles of short-range missiles and drones—previously having little use—will be thrown onto the battlefield. Each landing U.S. soldier can effectively “receive a share” of several missiles or drones on a per-person basis.

In the 2026 “Battle of Halqé Island,” the related islands may be a hub for Iran’s oil exports, but after they are seized they cannot cut off Iran’s energy output channels. Instead, because the islands are small and have no strategic depth, they become “living targets” for Iran’s firepower. The cost of long-term stationing far exceeds the military value of the operation itself. The selection of sites for both battlefields failed to account for strategic significance, difficulty of holding, and deployment cost; from the very beginning, it was destined that tactical victory would not be able to turn into strategic gains.

Normally, the U.S. Secretary of Defense is regarded as a “buffer pad” and “firewall” between U.S. politics and the military. But Hegseth (right) clearly has not played that role.

From the core principles of military strategy, choosing the site for combat must serve overall strategic objectives and have value in controlling key areas and influencing the direction of the war. The battlefields associated with both the “Battle of Hamburger Heights” and the “Battle of Halqé Island” fail to meet this condition. The reasons the U.S. military launches an attack are either political captivity or a misjudgment of battlefield value. This fundamental error in choosing the site becomes the source of strategic failure in both campaigns, and also the shared starting point for both as “strategic twins.”

2. Similar Wrong Targets

Both campaigns also share the same error in setting objectives—treating tactical victory as the core strategic objective and falling into a vicious cycle of “the more you fight, the deeper you get trapped; the more you win, the more you lose.” In the “Battle of Hamburger Heights,” the U.S. strategic objective was originally to clear North Vietnamese forces and ensure the safety of the A Sầu River Valley. But during the operations, tactical advances themselves became the objective; soldiers’ casualties and the capture of positions were treated as the only standard for measuring success, completely detached from overall strategic needs.

In terms of the battlefield environment, the U.S. assault on Halqé Island can only involve airborne drops; amphibious landings are limited by implementation difficulty and potential risks, and would likely be hard to carry out.

The potential actions in the “Battle of Halqé Island” also fall into the same trap of objective misalignment. America’s real needs are to suppress Iran’s nuclear capabilities and maintain Middle East hegemony, but the military action’s objective has been distorted into “seizing the island.” Tactical landing success is treated as strategic victory, while the huge cost of holding the island and strategic risks are ignored. This objective setup of “tactical supremacy, strategic absence” deprives both campaigns of the fundamental meaning of the operation, reducing them to mere military consumption.

Since February 28 up to now, Iran has demonstrated asymmetric area-denial capabilities, which is greatly exhausting the U.S. military’s traditional advantages.

The wrong objectives in both campaigns, in essence, stem from the rigidity of U.S. strategic thinking: overtrusting its own military advantages, ignoring the relationship between tactics and strategy, equating military action with “winning the battle,” while overlooking the key questions of “why fight” and “what happens after you’ve fought.” This same-origin fallacy in objectives makes the “Battle of Hamburger Heights” and the “Battle of Halqé Island” typical mirror images of U.S. strategic rigidity. In the end, both will lead to the outcome of tactical victory and strategic failure.

3. A Shared Tragic End

The “Battle of Hamburger Heights” and the “Battle of Halqé Island” will ultimately point to the same-origin tragic ending: tactical “winning” will turn into strategic “death.” It will be either to abandon “victory,” with sacrifices reduced to zero, or to cling to the quagmire and see the entire picture collapse. In the “Battle of Hamburger Heights,” U.S. forces, after taking the heights, ultimately chose to withdraw because they could not garrison there long-term and because strategic value was missing. All early casualties and sacrifices were wiped to zero. This tactical victory did nothing to help the Vietnam War overall; instead, it became a trigger for domestic anti-war sentiment.

Compared with the current battlefield attrition suffered by U.S. forces, once forces are air-dropped onto Halqé Island, even if the most favorable operation unfolds, all kinds of consumption would increase by geometric multiples.

The potential course of the “Battle of Halqé Island” is also unlikely to escape two kinds of tragic outcomes. If the U.S. seizes the island and then chooses to withdraw, it will be seen as “strategic retreat,” severely damaging America’s strategic credibility and making allies distrust it. If it chooses to hold on, it will fall into Iran’s sustained attrition: losses of forces and materiel will keep expanding, ultimately dragging down the U.S.’s military and economic strength and causing upheaval in the global strategic landscape. In either case, the early tactical victory will completely lose its meaning, becoming a catalyst for strategic failure.

Judging from the current situation, as of February 28, the U.S. leadership has clearly seriously underestimated the risk that the U.S.-Israel-Iran conflict would become prolonged.

The same-origin tragic outcome, in essence, is the absence of U.S. strategic planning: it considered neither how to respond strategically after tactical victory, nor the long-term risks of the operation. The tragedy of the “Battle of Hamburger Heights” is that it is “winning for nothing”; the tragedy of the “Battle of Halqé Island” is that it is “winning is losing.” Both outcomes share the same origin—inevitable results of U.S. strategic rigidity and objective misalignment.

4. An Even More Ruthless Final Fate

The subsequent fate of the “Battle of Halqé Island,” compared with the “Battle of Hamburger Heights,” will be even more brutal, and the degree of the U.S. strategic defeat will far exceed that of the wartime period. During the Vietnam War, although U.S. forces withdrew from the battlefield of the “Battle of Hamburger Heights,” they were still able to rely on overall military advantages to gradually shrink their Vietnam War forces, ultimately achieving strategic withdrawal—without causing a fundamental shock to their global hegemony.

Although the United States originally fled from Vietnam, it allowed many allies to “get their share of the meat.” The relationship between the “leader” and the “allies” was even closer. But now it is completely different.

In the “Battle of Halqé Island,” if the United States seizes the island and then chooses to withdraw, it will face a more severe strategic crisis than in the “Battle of Hamburger Heights.” Middle East allies may completely lose trust in the U.S., and America’s foundation for hegemony in the Middle East will collapse. At the same time, Iran would seize the opportunity to strengthen anti-U.S. alliances, further squeezing America’s geopolitical space. If the U.S. chooses to hold on, it will fall into endless military consumption; national strength would be continuously worn down, global influence sharply reduced, and it could even trigger direct confrontation with major powers such as Russia—leading to a remaking of the global strategic landscape.

If the United States truly falls into “strategic suicide” in the “Battle of Halqé Island,” then the damage of this war to America could even exceed the total of 10 years of the Vietnam War.

If we look at possible strategic consequences, the “Battle of Halqé Island” can be seen as an expanded version of the “Battle of Hamburger Heights.” But unlike the United States back then—after suffering the factual catastrophic defeat of the “Battle of Hamburger Heights” and the trauma of the Vietnam War, it was still able to recover—today’s United States is likely to suffer irreversible severe injuries due to the grave consequences of the “Battle of Halqé Island.” By then, even if the U.S. really wants to “return to the Western Hemisphere” or carry out “Tanluo Doctrine,” it will not be able to.