The United States wants to end the war by April 9? Israel and Iran have already fallen into a "disengagement dilemma" of interest "misalignment."

How Do Misaligned Interests Between the U.S. and Israel Hinder the Timely Conclusion of the War?

According to the Israeli Ynet news website, on March 23, a local time, an Israeli official stated that the U.S. has set April 9 as the target date to conclude the war against Iran.

As the U.S.-Israel-Iran war enters its fourth week, the prolongation of hostilities has gradually revealed the differences between the U.S. and Israel, becoming an X factor affecting the course of the war. The U.S. aims to end the war by April 9, but it may not be able to achieve this goal. The structural misalignment and even conflict of interests and strategic objectives have trapped the three parties in a “quagmire of withdrawal” under the current circumstances. Military actions are clearly unsustainable for all parties, and a forced conclusion is the inevitable outcome, but when the opportunity arises and how to exit will inevitably involve back-and-forth tugging by the parties involved, continuing to draw the attention of the region and the international community.

On March 20, 2026, in the Golan Heights controlled by Israel, the tail section of a ballistic missile launched from Iran was embedded in the ground of a vineyard. The U.S. and Israel launched a joint attack on Iran on February 28, after which Iran continued to launch multiple waves of drones and missiles at Israel. Visual China archive photo

From Blitz to Prolonged Conflict, U.S.-Israel Differences Surface

On March 18, Israel attacked Iran’s South Pars gas field, and Iran immediately struck at Qatar’s liquefied natural gas facilities, prompting Trump to publicly disclose the differences between the U.S. and Israel on his social media platform “Truth Social” for the first time—pressuring Israel in bold capital letters to “stop attacking” the South Pars gas field, while also stating that the U.S. was “unaware” of this attack, contrary to earlier reports from some U.S. and Israeli media that claimed “Trump had given his consent.”

Trump rarely expressed strong dissatisfaction with his staunch ally Israel, especially as the U.S.-Israel-Iran war was approaching its fourth week, with hostilities having dragged from an initial “blitz decapitation” into a prolonged conflict. The international community is bearing the costs of this conflict, and the U.S. particularly feels the backlash and harm: U.S. military bases have been repeatedly attacked, American soldiers have died overseas; the Strait of Hormuz is blocked, international oil prices have risen by over 40%, and U.S. stock markets continue to decline; levels of hatred are escalating, and room for negotiation is shrinking.

From the initial determination to win at the start of the war to the desperate situation three weeks later, the U.S. finds itself in a position of being unable to withdraw. The differences between the U.S. and Israel regarding military actions against Iran have also widened, directly affecting the U.S. and the unfolding of the battlefield. In fact, beneath the seemingly united military action based on common goals, the emphasis of concerns and demands from both the U.S. and Israel has been different from the very beginning, only obscured by the initial optimistic expectations of “the situation looking very good.”

Before the onset of this war, Iran experienced widespread national protests at the turn of the year. Due to a severe economic crisis, the public’s dissatisfaction with soaring inflation, rising prices, and currency devaluation projected significantly onto the Islamic Republic regime itself, leading to a surge in calls for “overthrowing the current regime and bringing back the Pahlavis.”

The domestic turmoil in Iran, coupled with the quick effectiveness of the U.S.'s “Operation Absolute Resolve” against Venezuela on January 3, undoubtedly led to an “optimistic judgment” by both the U.S. and Israel at that time, believing that the current Iranian regime was on the brink of collapse, and regime change was imminent, seemingly requiring only “a little external force” to at least replicate the “Venezuela model.” Based on the premise that “the effects of military action are immediate,” the decision for the U.S. and Israel to launch a joint strike indeed stemmed from a “shared consensus.”

For the U.S., since the most recent nuclear negotiations with Iran remain fraught with significant disagreements (especially regarding uranium enrichment activities) and have not yielded the desired results, it decided on a “military strike plus decapitation” approach, making the already “weak” Iranian regime’s officials fearful for their lives, either forcing them to make full concessions like Venezuela or leading to an “immediate collapse”; for Israel, Iran has always been the “backstage” of all anti-Israel forces in the region, and only by completely destroying the current regime and its military capabilities can the “proxies” such as Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Houthis be left leaderless, thus eliminating the “security threat” to Israel once and for all.

However, the course of the war has gradually diluted the consensus built on optimistic expectations and hubris: two weeks later, multiple U.S. intelligence reports admitted that the Iranian regime had not faced a risk of collapse despite the deaths of several high-ranking officials; Iran’s retaliation and Israel’s escalation have not only made the global oil and gas supply a heavy burden for the U.S. but have also continuously heightened the hostility between the warring parties, making it difficult to continue fighting without being overwhelmed and hard to find a breakthrough opportunity, while wanting to “call it a day” also presents a challenge.

Currently, the focus of the Trump administration has shifted from the Iranian regime and its high-ranking officials to two other issues: eliminating Iran’s nuclear capabilities and defense systems, and maintaining the stability of international oil and gas prices, urging allies and other countries to contribute to maintaining the safety and smoothness of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz. During this period, the U.S. also needs to seize the opportunity to announce a “victory” in a “decent” manner in order to withdraw, alleviating the economic pressure on the U.S., especially regarding inflation.

It is clear that Israel’s current focus of action is in stark contrast to that of the White House. On one hand, with approximately 40 Iranian officials already killed, Israel has not ceased its “targeted assassinations” of Iranian officials; recently, it has “eliminated” the Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, Ali Larijani, the commander of the Basij militia, Gholamreza Soleimani, the intelligence minister, Ismail Khatib, and the spokesperson for the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, Ali Mohammad Naqini. In short, Israel remains fixated on the Iranian regime itself.

On the other hand, Israel is attempting to escalate the intensity, scale, and scope of the war, disregarding the U.S. and international community’s concerns regarding energy security and shipping safety. In addition to targeting the Iranian regime, attacks on Iran’s oil, gas, and nuclear facilities, Israel has extended its warfare beyond Iran, launching “limited ground operations” against southern Lebanon under the pretext of eliminating Hezbollah and striking military facilities in southern Syria under the justification of “avenging the Druze.”

Misaligned Demands, Three Parties Trapped in a “Withdrawal Dilemma”

Now, as the U.S. and Israel turn their firepower on Iran’s nuclear facilities, their respective focuses remain different. The Trump administration is clearly more “impatient” regarding time, even threatening to destroy Iranian power plants and demanding that Iran fully open the Strait of Hormuz within 48 hours; Israel, on the other hand, continues its existing rhetoric, authorizing its military to strike “any senior Iranian officials” without approval or restrictions, and has proposed the possibility of “ground operations” for regime change.

Currently, the statements regarding the timeline for ending the war from the U.S., Israel, and Iran are all different, with hardline tones but vague substantive content, leaving room for interpretation. However, considering their respective internal demands and the actual trajectory of the battlefield situation, it is evident that the claims and concerns of the three parties are increasingly misaligned in fierce competition, putting them all in a state of being unable to withdraw. While endless military conflict ultimately benefits no one, the fact that all parties are trapped in a “withdrawal dilemma” is often the greatest barrier to a ceasefire.

Trump believed that by leveraging the rapid surgical strikes of the U.S. and Israel to “clear out” Khamenei and leave the Islamic Republic “leaderless,” while also prompting the Iranian protestors to intensify their pressure to “overthrow the regime,” the outcome would be either the collapse of the current Iranian regime or its unconditional submission to the U.S., both of which would completely eliminate Iran’s nuclear capabilities, dismantle the “axis of resistance,” and achieve the strategic objectives outlined in the new U.S. National Security Strategy report regarding the Middle East: eliminating “security threats,” achieving “regional peace,” controlling the energy supply chain, thus allowing the U.S. to withdraw to some extent from the region and shift its strategic focus to other areas (mainly the Western Hemisphere).

To date, none of these goals have been truly realized: the current Iranian regime and the “axis of resistance” have been severely damaged but continue to fight, let alone “abandoning nuclear ambitions”; there has been no new “anti-government protest wave” in Iranian society, which has a deep-rooted anti-intervention and nationalist foundation; the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, the energy supply crisis, and inflation have exacerbated discontent within the U.S., with nearly 60% of Americans opposing this war… Trump has yet to find a “good opportunity,” making it difficult to narrate a “victory” and exit—especially since, following Larijani’s death, it has become nearly impossible for the Iranian regime, dominated by the IRGC and hardliners, to find a negotiation counterpart.

The U.S. finds itself in a dilemma, which is not without the role of Israel and Netanyahu’s government. Since its establishment in 1948, Israel has adhered to an “absolute security perspective,” with the logic of “maximizing security” prompting the country to pursue independence, possess strong military capabilities, and seek regional dominance, while the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the Israel-Iran conflict, and the Arab-Israeli tensions are all viewed as threats to “absolute security.” After more than two years of Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Israel has further stifled the conditions for Palestinian survival and nationhood, naturally shifting the focus back to Iran as the U.S. redirects its attention.

Regarding the narrative of eliminating Iran’s so-called “nuclear threat” and “terrorism threat,” Israel is even more persistent than the U.S., and from the Israeli government’s perspective, only by overthrowing the Islamic Republic and achieving regime change can they completely root out the “anti-Israel factors,” dismantle the “axis of resistance,” leaving all anti-Israel forces such as Hamas, Islamic Jihad, Hezbollah, and the Houthis in disarray, thus achieving the goal of absolute security and a “Zionist” Jewish state. For this reason, Israel will not miss the rare opportunity presented by the U.S. to withdraw, driven by the mentality of “this opportunity will not come again,” and will not rest until its objectives are met.

Moreover, escalating the frontlines and prolonging the war also serves Netanyahu’s government and personal security interests. According to plans, Israel will hold elections on October 27 this year, widely seen as a vote of confidence for Netanyahu’s government. In recent years, societal dissatisfaction with this “most right-wing” government has arisen from controversies over judicial reforms, the hostage issues in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, provocations by far-right members of the coalition government, and conflicts with the military. Netanyahu himself faces potential imprisonment due to three criminal charges (bribery, fraud, and breach of public trust).

Thus, maintaining political power and Netanyahu’s personal freedom are interconnected in motivation, while reinforcing the narrative of “national security” through external warfare is almost a path dependence that the Israeli government has repeatedly relied on in recent years to shift domestic pressure, mobilize public support, and stabilize governance, with this strategy also showing clear effects this time: a poll conducted by the Israel Democracy Institute (IDI) on March 4 showed that 82% of Israelis support military actions against Iran; the Jewish community, regardless of political spectrum, overwhelmingly supports the war, with 57% believing that both military objectives and the goal of “regime change” in Iran should be achieved concurrently.

As a result, Israel relentlessly eliminates Iranian high-level officials, achieving a dual effect of “regime overthrow” and further provoking Iran, eliminating potential negotiating representatives and the possibility of peace talks. Correspondingly, Iran, which has announced a “shift from defense to offense,” has even less need for “compromise and ceasefire for peace.” Since its establishment in 1979, the Islamic Republic has hardly experienced a period of “calm,” having survived external threats and conflicts from the Iran-Iraq War, international sanctions, intermittent proxy conflicts, the Iran-Israel war, to the current U.S.-Israel-Iran war.

The Iranian regime has not only grown accustomed to this state of survival but has also developed a unique mode of operation and survival under such conditions, such as a power base supported by clerics, military, and civilian groups, along with a “resistance economy” dominated by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. As the war drags on, hardliners have become the dominant force within the regime, while the voices of moderates and reformists have almost disappeared, and the nationalist narrative of resisting invasion can be used to unite domestic society, with the rigidity of the regime and the flexibility of negotiating turns mutually reinforcing.

For Iran, while it appears to be “passively taking hits,” as long as the regime does not collapse, the battlefield does not falter, and the internal structure does not disintegrate, the current instinct is to continue counterattacking, seek opportunities, and leverage energy security while shifting pressure onto the U.S. and Israel through regional countries and the international community. Of course, there is no such thing as an endless single engagement in warfare; the ultimate goal of the U.S., Israel, and Iran is to cease hostilities in a manner favorable to themselves, but no one can predict when the opportunity to do so will arise.

Perhaps there will come a moment when Trump can unilaterally declare “victory,” and although Netanyahu may be reluctant, he can also accept it and announce that the “threat has weakened,” while Tehran declares “resistance has succeeded”; perhaps the energy crisis and security deficit will spill over, prompting increased pressure from the international community and indirectly facilitating a way to cease hostilities among the three parties; or perhaps the Iranian regime will truly “collapse” or “yield” under internal and external pressures (though this possibility is relatively low). At least for now, the “withdrawal dilemma” has yet to find a key to unlock it, and countries in the region and the world continue to bear the costs of war.

(Hu Yukun, international political columnist, member of the China Translators Association)