In an era where everyone is competing for TPS, one project is focusing on a more important issue: how to prevent malicious nodes from damaging the entire network while keeping validator identities confidential?

This answer is called SBA consensus. The core mechanism is to allow validators to use zero-knowledge proofs to vote anonymously. The network only needs to verify these mathematical proofs, and cannot see who is voting. This way, large validators are also not afraid of targeted attacks or being extorted by multiple nodes.

But here’s the problem—it's like dancing on a tightrope. Improving security and privacy protection comes at the cost of increased complexity in consensus logic, and the network communication costs also rise. The performance ceiling is no longer just about simple transaction speed but is determined by the efficiency of processing cryptographic proofs.

The real risk points to watch are: overly complex mechanisms may hinder network stability and flexibility for future upgrades. After the mainnet launches, two key metrics should be monitored—whether block production times are stable and the validator node attrition rate. If validators frequently go offline, it’s likely due to high operational costs or technical difficulties exceeding expectations.

Here's a question to consider: for a financial chain, is thorough decentralization of validators more important, or is the network better protected by the attack resistance of hidden validators?