The game of anonymity - ForkLog: cryptocurrencies, AI, singularity, the future

# The Game of Anonymity

Why Optional Privacy in Zcash Doesn’t Work

For a long time, Zcash’s reputation as an anonymous cryptocurrency was taken for granted. Arkham’s research showed that even complex cryptography doesn’t protect users from de-anonymization if privacy isn’t enforced in practice.

Together with the Bitcoin mixer Mixer.Money team, we explore why anonymous coins don’t work “out of the box” and how to build real protection for financial privacy.

The Illusion of Privacy

In December 2025, the Arkham analytics platform announced that it had linked over 53% of all Zcash transactions — both transparent and shielded — to known individuals and organizations. More than 48% of inputs and outputs are associated with specific entities.

Zcash creator Zuko Wilcox partially refuted the analysts’ claims. According to him, the platform did not de-anonymize “a single ZEC” stored in protected pools.

However, Arkham’s research shows that protected pools cannot safeguard users who leak information at other stages.

“This clearly demonstrates that privacy is not a property of the coin but a result of user behavior,” — emphasizes Mixer.Money.

The architecture of Zcash is inherently a compromise. The network supports two types of addresses: transparent (t-addresses) and shielded (z-addresses). The first operate similarly to Bitcoin — all transactions are visible on the blockchain. The second use zk-SNARK cryptography to hide the sender, receiver, and amount.

In practice, most network participants choose transparent addresses because they are simple and exchanges accept deposits and withdrawals in Zcash only on them. Transitions between address types create correlation points, allowing analysts to reconstruct links between transactions.

As researcher pseudonym Seth For Privacy notes, Zcash tries to be everything for everyone instead of focusing on privacy technologies.

The project aims to provide easy entry into the crypto world while maintaining accessibility on centralized exchanges. At the same time, the team develops private payments through iterations of cryptographic solutions. Parallel work is underway on ZSA (Zcash Shielded Assets) and smart contracts to compete with Ethereum.

Such dispersion dilutes development resources. Despite significant funding and the cryptocurrency’s growth in October and November 2025, Zcash still hasn’t achieved full support for shielded addresses in popular hardware wallets like Ledger and Trezor.

Privacy as Behavior, Not Technology

The key takeaway from Zcash’s story is universal and not limited to one coin. Advanced cryptography doesn’t protect against linking to exchanges with KYC, transferring funds without breaking the history, using a single address, or predictable transaction timing.

“This applies to any system where privacy is optional,” — note in Mixer.Money.

Relying solely on “anonymous coins” creates a false sense of security. Users think they are protected just by using Zcash, but make mistakes that completely nullify cryptographic privacy guarantees.

Arkham’s research shows that analysts can restore transaction links by analyzing timing patterns, matching input and output amounts in shielded pools, and tracking interactions with known exchange addresses. None of these techniques require cryptographic hacking — just observing user behavior.

Why Bitcoin with Mixers Works More Pragmatically

Unlike Zcash, Bitcoin has never positioned itself as a private system. Its blockchain is transparent by default — every transaction is visible to all network participants. This makes the privacy model more honest and manageable.

Bitcoin mixers solve a specific problem — breaking the on-chain link between input and output funds. They do not promise abstract anonymity but enable a concrete action: separating the source of funds from a new address, destroying behavioral and graph connections, reducing clustering risks, and allowing continued use of Bitcoin without a “tail” of history.

“Private coins assume that the user relies on protocol promises. Bitcoin mixers require deliberate action,” — summarize in Mixer.Money.

A mixer in this context is an infrastructure tool operating on top of Bitcoin. The service doesn’t depend on the architecture of a particular private coin and doesn’t require users to understand address types or cryptography details.

The difference between Zcash and Bitcoin mixers is not in the cryptography level but in the responsibility model. Zcash offers privacy as an option but doesn’t control its application: users can enable shielded addresses or stay on transparent ones.

Bitcoin mixers require intentional action but provide predictable results. Users understand where the history is broken and what risks they reduce. This diminishes the illusion of security and puts control back into the hands of the user.

“Bitcoin mixers appeared before private coins and remain in demand today. The market prefers practicality: most crypto investors will choose Bitcoin as their main asset with the option to use privacy tools when needed,” — note in Mixer.Money.

Knowing What to Do

Zcash’s story shows that privacy cannot be “turned on” with a single button. It must be ensured during receipt, storage, and transfer of funds.

In this model, mixers serve as an intermediate privacy layer. They do not replace user caution but eliminate a key problem of Bitcoin: the public linkability of UTXO.

“Privacy is not a property that can be bought along with the coin. It is a process that requires attention at every stage,” — conclude in Mixer.Money.

Built-in privacy does not guarantee anonymity if the user makes mistakes. Bitcoin combined with tools like Mixer.Money does not promise perfect anonymity but provides a transparent and manageable privacy model. This, rather than the label “private coin,” determines the actual level of protection.